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U.S. V. WARSHAK: WILL FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION BE
DELIVERED TO YOUR INBOX?
Casey Perry*
The Warshak decision is a long-overdue federal case extending
Fourth Amendment protection to electronic communications stored
with third parties. In holding that citizens have a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" for stored e-mail messages, the Sixth
Circuit decision represents a shift towards a stricter interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment as it applies to modern forms of
communication. Applauded by civil liberties and privacy
protection groups, Warshak may pave the way for communication
over other digital means (e.g., cloud computing, Facebook,
LinkedIn) to obtain Fourth Amendment protection, through
application of a two-prong test to determine the existence of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Warshak also highlights
blatant loopholes in the current federal statutory scheme,
underscoring the need for revision of the Stored Communications
Act in order to bring the law in line with modern technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are few concepts as deeply entrenched in American law
as individual privacy. The fervent reverence afforded to privacy as
a fundamental human right is reflected in our Constitution,
particularly in the Bill of Rights.' One of the most important
* J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2012.
Though the U.S. Constitution contains no explicit right to privacy, many of
the first ten amendments protect particular aspects of individual privacy. For
example, the Third Amendment safeguard against the nonconsensual quartering
of soldiers is often interpreted as the Founders' expression of protecting privacy,
as are the individual liberties enumerated in the First Amendment. See Doug
Linder, The Right of Privacy, EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/rightofprivacy.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2011) (maintaining that the Bill of Rights reflects the
Framers' concern for the protection of individual's privacy rights).
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safeguards of individual privacy is found in the Fourth
Amendment right of the people to be secure "in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures," requiring that warrants be issued only upon a showing of
probable cause and specifying "the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." 2 While the language of the Fourth
Amendment makes it clear that the Founders intended to limit the
use of searches and seizures to those that are reasonable,' what
constitutes a "reasonable" search and seizure has been extensively
debated.4
2 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. While some "highly cherished freedoms, such as
those relating to speech, religion, press and trial by jury were lumped in together
with others," the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures was
considered important enough to constitute a single amendment. Charles A.
Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class
Constitutional Right?, 25 IND. L.J. 259, 273 (1950).
See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547, 551 (1999) (discussing the Founders' intent to limit searches
and seizures and condemn the use of general warrants).
4 Compare Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Ralph B. Taylor & Alan T. Harland,
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Third-Party Consent Searches, 15 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 121, 122 (1999) (stating that the Fourth Amendment indicates
that searches are only "reasonable" if they are conducted under a warrant
representing judicial determination of probable cause or, alternatively, if they
fall under an exception to the warrant requirement made by the United States
Supreme Court over the years), and Reynard, supra note 2, at 276 (contending
that the Fourth Amendment offers dual guarantees, both that warrants shall be
issued with probable cause and particularity and that no unreasonable searches
or seizures shall be made, even with a warrant), with Davies, supra note 3, at
551 (opining that the Founders did not consider the application of
"unreasonable" to unwarranted searches at all, but meant for the standard to
apply to the "inherent illegality of any searches or seizures . . . under general
warrants."), David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2000) (arguing that modern courts determine
whether a search or seizure is "unreasonable" based on "the realities of modem
law enforcement rather than the eighteenth-century origins of the Fourth
Amendment"), and Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 201 (1993) (arguing in support of
the theory that the Fourth Amendment "merely requires rational police behavior
. . ."). But see Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 395 (1974) (stating succinctly that "its language is no
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Today, the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is used to
determine whether a search meets the reasonableness requirement,
and to define when law enforcement's finding and taking of
property is a "seizure" protected by the Fourth Amendment.' As
Justice Harlan explained in Katz v. United States, the expectation
of privacy test that has emerged is twofold, requiring first, that a
person "have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable." 6 Applying this test, courts
have found that certain mediums of communication, including the
telephone and postal mail, are protected by a reasonable
expectation of privacy.' These decisions require law enforcement
to obtain a valid warrant based on probable cause before seizing
such communications.'
Today, as people increasingly turn to digital means of
communication in both their private and professional lives, many
have called for the expansion of Fourth Amendment protection to
incorporate a modern interpretation of an individual's "papers and
effects."' Despite this push for the Fourth Amendment to keep
help and neither is its history" and that we can glean a better understanding of
"reasonableness" from the origin of the Fourth Amendment).
"I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only (a) that ... a
person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (b)
that electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense
private may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (c) that the
invasion of a constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the
Court has long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search
warrant." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
6 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
7 See id. at 352-59 (holding that the practice of wiretapping telephone calls is
subject to the Fourth Amendment, because of the "vital role that the public
telephone has come to play in private communication"); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) ("Letters and other sealed packages are in
the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate
expectation of privacy . . . .").
8 See, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114 ("[W]arrantless searches of [the general
class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of
privacy] are presumptively unreasonable.").
9 See, e.g., Andrew William Bagley, Don't Be Evil: The Fourth Amendment
in the Age of Google, National Security, and Digital Papers and Effects, 21
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pace with evolving technology,o there has been little direction
from the federal courts regarding the reasonable expectation of
privacy for di ital communication, including emails. However, on
December 14' , 2010, the Sixth Circuit of Appeals took a critical
first step towards defining these issues, addressing the applicability
of the Fourth Amendment protection to emails stored with internet
service providers ("ISPs")" in the landmark case of United States
v. Warshak.12
In Warshak, the Sixth Circuit held that the reasonable
expectation of privacy for communication via telephone and postal
mail extends to emails stored with third parties, bringing stored
emails within the protection of the Fourth Amendment." As the
only federal appellate decision to rule on the privacy of stored
emails,14 Warshak prompts a series of questions, not only about the
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 153 (2011) (urging an update of the Fourth Amendment
to reflect the reality that papers and effects are now often digital in nature).
10 "To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit
police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment."
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
" Susan Freiwald, Susan Freiwald on United States v. Warshak: Sixth Circuit
Brings Fourth Amendment Protection to Stored Email, At Last, CONCURRING
OPINIoNS BLOG, posted by Danielle Citron (Dec. 17, 2010, 3:15 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/12/susan-freiwald-on-united-
states-v-warshak-sixth-circuit-brings-fourth-amendment-protection-to-stored-
email-at-last.html [hereinafter Friewald, Susan Friewald on United States v.
Warshak]. The Stored Communications Act, a federal law addressing stored
wire and electronic communications, is discussed infra Part II. Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs") are businesses or organizations that offer Internet access,
often in the form of broadband or dial-up Internet access. What is an Internet
Service Provider (ISP)?, INDIANA UNIVERSITY KNOWLEDGE BASE,
http://kb.iu.edu/data/ahoz.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
12 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
1 Margaret Grazzini, U.S. v. Warshak: The Constitutionality of Search and
Seizure of Emails, THE BERKELEY TECH L.J. BOLT (Dec. 23, 2010),
http://btlj.org/2010/12/23/u-s-v-warshak-the-constitutionality-of-search-and-
seizure-of-e-mails/; see also Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (holding that the
government may not compel emails from an ISP without "a warrant based on
probable cause").
14 Kevin Bankston, Breaking News on EFF Victory: Appeals Court Holds
that E-Mail Privacy Protected by Fourth Amendment, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (Dec. 14, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/12/breaking-
news-eff-victory-appeals-court-holds.
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future of privacy in electronic communications, but also about the
efficiency and effectiveness of current federal privacy laws relating
to the government's ability to search and seize stored electronic
communications. 15
In order to fully understand the Warshak decision and its
implications, Part II of this Recent Development will provide a
brief explanation of the Stored Communications Act,"6 a federal
statute addressing electronic communication privacy critical to the
Warshak opinion. Part III will then introduce the Warshak"
decision itself, including the prior history of the case. Part IV
discusses the potential need for Congressional reform of the Stored
Communications Act, based on loopholes highlighted by the
Warshak investigation. Finally, Part V will look towards the future
of the Warshak decision and its implications for the rest of the
country, followed by a brief conclusion.
II. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
Supplementing the Fourth Amendment, there are three primary
federal statutes that serve to protect individuals' privacy in a
network environment, collectively known as the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA").'" The Stored
Communications Act, the Wiretap Act, and the Pen Register
statute regulate criminal investigators' access to both in-transit
electronic communications and stored content, including emails
stored with ISPs. The Stored Communications Act, regulating
1 See id. (advocating for Congress to revise the Stored Communications Act
to clearly require warrants to obtain emails from ISPs in light of the Warshak
ruling).
16 The Stored Communications Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12
(2006) and discussed infra Part II.
7 631 F.3d 266.
'
8 See ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 456 (2d ed. 2006).
19 Id. at 456. The Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, "regulates efforts to
collect evidence by intercepting the contents of Internet communications in real
time." KERR, supra note 18, at 256. The Pen Register statute, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3121-27, regulates "collecting evidence by obtaining non-content
information in real time." Id. at 456. The Wiretap Act and the Pen Register
statute were not referenced in the Warshak opinion and are thus outside the
SPRING 2011] 349
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access to stored content, was particularly relevant to the Warshak
case and thus requires a brief explanation.
A. The Structure of the Stored Communications Act
Passed in 1986 as part of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986,20 the Stored Communications Act ("SCA") is
a federal statute that regulates access to stored electronic
communications.2 1 The SCA regulates retrospective surveillance,22
specifically content that is in storage with an ISP. 23 Two of the
principal provisions of the SCA are found in sections 2702 and
2703, which regulate voluntary disclosures and compelled
disclosures, respectively.2 4 In section 2703, the SCA imposes strict
scope of this Recent Development. For more on these statutes, see id at 461-97
(on the Wiretap Act) and 497-510 (on the Pen Register statute).
20 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 was created to fill
gaps in existing privacy law created by changing technologies, specifically
computer network technologies, amounting to "a statutory version of the Fourth
Amendment for computer networks." Id. at 458-59.
21 Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 (2004).
22 Kerr describes retroactive surveillance as "access to stored communications
that may be kept in the ordinary course of business by a third-party provider"
and gives the following example:
[I]f an FBI agent issues a subpoena ordering an ISP to disclose basic
subscriber information about a particular Internet account, that access
is a type of retrospective surveillance. The ISP will have generated
that record at some time in the past in the ordinary course of its
business; the subpoena seeks the disclosure of a stored record that
already has been created.
KERR, supra note 18, at 459. In contrast, prospective surveillance
refers to "obtaining communications still in the course of
transmission." Id. The Wiretap Act and the Pen Register statute both
deal with prospective surveillance. Id.
23 Id. at 510. The SCA does not apply to communication that is in transit.
See, e.g., Dorothy Higdon Murphy, United States v. Councilman and the Scope
of the Wiretap Act: Do Old Laws Cover New Technologies?, 6 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 437, 459 (2005) ("The SCA, however, does not apply to messages that
are still in transmission. Electronic messages that are in transmission are
covered by the Wiretap Act.").
24 KERR, supra note 18, at 511. Other important sections include § 2705, the
delayed notice provision, § 2708, the remedies limitation, and § 2711, which
includes definitions. Id.
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rules on when the government may compel service providers to
disclose information they are storing on their subscribers. 25  The
SCA creates similar limits on voluntary disclosures to the
government by ISPs in section 2702, heightening the protection
provided by the private search doctrine of the Fourth
Amendment.26 According to the United States Department of
Justice, the SCA serves "to protect and regulate the privacy
interests of network users with respect to government . . . and the
"127 ~cutworld at large, yet courts have had a difficult time interpreting
and applying the statute, due in no small part to its density and
complexity. 28
B. Government Access under the SCA
In regulating government access to emails, the SCA offers
various levels of protection based on the length of time the email
has been stored electronically and the type of service in which the
25 Id "Although the Fourth Amendment may require no more than a
subpoena to obtain e-mails, the statute confers greater privacy protection." Id.26 d
27 COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIMINAL Div., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 115 (3rd ed.
2009), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf.
28 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 21, at 1208 ("But courts, legislators, and even
legal scholars have had a very hard time understanding the method behind the
madness of the SCA. The statute is dense and confusing, and that confusion has
made it difficult for legislators to legislate in the field, reporters to report about
it, and scholars to write scholarship in this very important area"); United States
v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Steve Jackson Games,
Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994)) (referring
to the provisions of the ECPA as "famous (if not infamous) for [their] lack of
clarity" and the "complex, often convoluted" intersection of the SCA and the
Wiretap Act); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.
2002) (describing the statutory framework as "ill-suited to address modem
forms of communication" like a secure website); Lieutenant Colonel LeEllen
Coacher, Permitting Systems Protection Monitoring: When the Government
Can Look and What It Can See, 46 A.F. L. REV. 155, 171 (1999) (commenting
that the intent of Congress to cover email transmissions via the ECPA was
obscured by the complexity of the statutory language).
SPRING 2011] 351
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email is held. 29  For example, emails stored with an electronic
communication service for less than 180 days may be acquired
"only pursuant to a warrant." 30  Emails stored with a remote
computing service and those stored with an electronic
communication service for more than 180 days require the
government to either obtain a search warrant, an administrative
subpoena, or a court order.' Though probable cause is required to
obtain a search warrant, the SCA allows subpoenas and court
orders to be issued under much lower standards than those of the
Fourth Amendment, requiring only that the government entity
offer "specific and articulable facts" showing "reasonable
grounds" to believe that the contents of the communication "are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."3 2
III. UNITED STATES V. WARSHAK
The Warshak case was not one, but a series of cases, both
criminal and civil. The Sixth Circuit case at issue stems from
29 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283 (6th Cir. 2010). Emails may
be held with either an electronic communication service or a remote computing
service. Id. The U.S. Code defines an electronic communication service as
"any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire
or electronic communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). A remote computing
service is defined as "the provision to the public of computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communications system." 18
U.S.C. § 2711(2). If these definitions seem less than clear, you are not alone.
See supra text accompanying note 28.
30 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
3 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 283. The court in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated
Dec. 10, 1987 distinguished subpoenas from search warrants:
Subpoenas are not search warrants. They involve different levels of
intrusion on a person's privacy. A search warrant allows the officer to
enter the person's premises, and to examine for himself the person's
belongings. The officer, pursuant to the warrant, determines what is
seized.... Service of a forthwith subpoena does not authorize an entry
into a private residence. Furthermore, the person served determines
whether he will surrender the items identified in the subpoena or
challenge the validity of the subpoena prior to compliance.
926 F.2d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 1991).
32 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
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Warshak's appeal from his May 2008 conviction by the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio."
A. The Controversial Seizure of Warshak's Emails
The Warshak case arose out of a criminal investigation
involving Stephen Warshak, his mother Harriet,3 4 and the
management of his mail-order nutritional supplements business,
Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, Inc. ("Berkeley")." From all
accounts, Warshak ran a shady business centered around the sale
of its flagship product, the infamous Enzyte male enhancement
supplement. 6 In addition to the now infamous "Smilin' Bob"
commercials," Berkeley's advertising techniques for Enzyte
included a bogus independent customer study," a spurious
customer satisfaction rating," and the lauding of impressive but
33 United States v. Warshak, 562 F. Supp. 2d 986 (S.D. Ohio 2008).
34 Warshak's company employed "approximately 12 to 15 people, nearly all
of whom were Warshak's friends and family." Warshak, 631 F.3d at 276.
Harriet was Warshak's mother as well as an employee of the business, in which
capacity she processed credit card payments. Id. Warshak also employed his
sister, who worked in Customer Care, and his brother-in-law, who served as
President of the company. Id.
35 Warshak did not own just one, but "a handful" of companies. Id One, TCI
Media, Inc., sold advertisements in sporting venues, while other assorted
"nutraceuticals" companies operating under various names were later aggregated
to form Berkeley. Id. In addition to herbal supplements, the companies also
sold a product marketed to mask drug traces in urine tests, called Keflex. Id at
276 n.1.
36 Id. at 276-77. Enzyte, purported to "increase the size of a man's erection,"
pushed Berkeley's annual sales to nearly $250 million in 2004. Id. at 276.
37 "Smilin' Bob" was a character featured in Enzyte commercials
characterized by an "exaggerated smile .. . presumably the result of Enzyte's
efficacy." Id. at 277. A clip of Smilin' Bob is still available on the Enzyte
website. ENZYTE, http://www.enzyte.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
38 The study, published in a number of men's interest magazines and
referenced in radio advertisements and on the company website, claimed that
"over a three-month period, 100 English-speaking men who took Enzyte
experienced a 12 to 31% increase in the size of their penises." Warshak, 631
F.3d at 277. A Berkeley employee, James Teegarden, later testified that
Warshak instructed him to fabricate the survey with numbers he "plucked . . .
out of the air." Id.
39 Though Berkeley boasted a 96% satisfaction rating for Enzyte, Teegarden
testified that this, too, was bogus. Id. Warshak had his employee "harvest 500
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fictitious doctors that supposedly developed the drug.4 0 Berkeley
employed the use of a continuity or negative-option auto-ship
program to distribute their products, 4' but customers were neither
given notification of their enrollment nor required to authorize the
additional charges.42 Customers that attempted to obtain a refund
were forced to deal with Berkeley's refund policy to "make it as
difficult as possible." 43  Additionally, Berkeley scammed their
credit-card processors and the merchant banks from which they
names from the customer database," marking 'X' by either "satisfied or very
satisfied on say 475 of those" in order to reach the phony satisfaction statistic.
Id.
40 Dr. Fredrick Thomkins, "a physician with a biology degree from Stanford,"
and Dr. Michael Moore, "a leading urologist from Harvard," were credited in
print and radio advertisements for the development of Enzyte. Id.
Unfortunately for Berkeley, investigators who contacted the alleged doctors'
alma maters found that neither man existed. Id.
41 After a customer ordered a free trial of a product, he would continue to
receive shipments-and credit card charges-until he opted out. Id at 277-78.
"The shipments and charges would continue until the customer decided to
withdraw from the program, which required the customer to notify the
company." Id.
42 After over 1,500 complaints to the Better Business Bureau, Berkeley
claimed to have added disclosure language into their sales scripts and changed
their notification policies, but the evidence suggests these measures were
superficial at best. Id. at 278-79. In some instances, customers were enrolled in
the auto-ship program after explicitly declining:
For example, in November 2003, Berkeley hired a company called
West to handle "sales calls that were from . . . Avlimil or Enzyte
advertisements." During the calls, West's representatives asked
customers if they wanted to be enrolled in the auto-ship program, and
over 80% of customers declined. When Warshak learned what was
happening, he issued instructions to "take those customers, even if they
decline[d], even if they said no to the Auto-Ship program, go ahead
and put them on the Auto-Ship program." A subsequent email between
Berkeley employees indicated that "all [West] customers, whether they
know it or not, are going on [auto-ship]." As a result, numerous
telephone orders resulted in unauthorized continuity shipments.
Id. at 279.
43 Id. at 280 n.10. Some customers were even told they would have to present
a notarized statement indicating that they had seen "no size increase," based on
the "admittedly ingenious idea" that customers would be too embarrassed to
obtain such a notarization. Id.
354 [VOL. 12: 345
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obtained their lines of credit by falsifying applications" and using
elaborate ploys to keep Berkeley's chargeback ratio45 artificially
low. Eventually, these questionable practices led to the September
2006 grand jury indictment of Warshak, Harriet, and others on a
combined 112 counts, including conspiracy to commit mail, wire,
and bank fraud; mail fraud; bank fraud; making false statements to
banks; money laundering; misbranding; and conspiracy to obstruct
a Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") proceeding.46
In the process of obtaining evidence to support these charges,
government agents became interested in emails stored with
Warshak's ISP, NuVox.4 7 In October 2004, operating under
section 2703(f) of the SCA,48 the government formally requested
"4After having an account terminated with the Bank of Kentucky, Warshak
often used his mother to apply for merchant accounts at other banks, falsely
listing her as CEO and 100% owner of Berkeley. Id. at 280. Other times,
Warshak would falsify applications by claiming he had never been previously
terminated from a merchant account. Id.
45 A chargeback, occurring when a customer contacts the credit card company
and successfully disputes a charge, is undesirable for merchant banks,
representing increased financial risk from the merchant company. Id. at 279-80.
Typically, if chargebacks result from more than 1% of a merchant company's
transactions, their account will be terminated. Id at 280. Berkeley used a
strategy called "double-dinging," in which they split up a single transaction into
multiple charges, in order to inflate the denominator (the number of
transactions) of their chargeback ratio. Id at 280. Other times, they would
charge and then refund randomly selected customers, blaming a "computer
glitch" if anyone complained. Id. at 281.
46 Id. at 281. The 112 charges were spread amongst the three defendants in
this case (Steven Warshak, owner and operator of Berkeley, Harriet Warshak,
the mother of Steven and an employee of Berkeley, and TCI Media, Inc.,
another company owned by Steven), as well as "several others with various
crimes related to Berkeley's business." Id.
47 Id. at 283.
48 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (2006). Section 2703 regulates compelled disclosures
of stored communications. Specifically, § 2703(f lists the requirements to
preserve evidence:
(1) In general.-A provider of wire or electronic communication
services or a remote computing service, upon the request of a
governmental entity, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records
and other evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a court
order or other process.
Id.
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that NuVox preserve all of Warshak's future incoming and
outgoing emails.49 in subsequent months, NuVox preserved copies
of approximately 27,000 of Warshak's emails without his
knowledge or permission, pursuant to the government's directive."o
After obtaining a subpoena under the SCA in January 2005, the
government compelled NuVox to turn over the emails it had begun
preserving in October 2004, as well as any additional emails in
Warshak's account," a total of approximately 27,000 emails.52
Warshak did not receive notice of the subpoena or of the
corresponding preservation of his emails until May 2006."
Warshak's subsequent motion to exclude the emails obtained
from NuVox from being used as evidence was denied,54 freeing the
government to use them at trial. The contents of the emails turned
over to the government contained "sensitive and sometimes
damning substance"55 which was used to convict the defendants on
the majority of the 112 charges, including mail fraud, bank fraud,
and money laundering. 6 Warshak was sentenced to twenty-five
years imprisonment and ordered to pay $459,450,000 in proceeds-
money-judgment forfeiture, $44,876,781.68 in money-laundering-
49 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 283. Warshak accessed his emails using Post Office
Protocol ("POP"), in which emails are generally deleted from the ISP server
when they are downloaded to the subscriber's personal computer. Id. at 283
n.14.
50 id.
s' These "additional emails" were obtained pursuant to an ex parte court order
under § 2703(d) of the SCA. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
52 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 283.
54 Id at 281.
5 5 1d at 284.
56 Id. at 281. Warshak was acquitted of fifteen of these charges, including
making false statements to banks and misbranding offenses. Warshak's mother,
Harriet, was also acquitted of making false statements to banks. Id.
356 [VOL. 12: 345
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judgment forfeiture, and a fine of $93,000."7 The defendants
appealed the district court ruling to the Sixth Circuit."
" Id. at 281-82. Harriet was held jointly and severally liable for both of the
forfeiture judgments, sentenced to twenty-four months in prison, and made to
pay an $800 special assessment. TCI was put on probation for five years and
fined $160,000 with a special assessment of $6,400. Id.
58 While the 112-count indictment was awaiting trial, Warshak brought a civil
suit against the government for the warrantless seizure of his emails in June
2006, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. See Warshak v. United States,
490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Warshak 1]; Warshak v. United States,
532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (rehearing en banc granted, opinion vacated, Oct.
9, 2007) [hereinafter Warshak Il]. At trial, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio granted Warshak's request for injunctive relief,
preventing the government from conducting unwarranted searches until final
disposition of the case. Warshak I at 461. Following the government's appeal
of the injunction, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the Warshak civil
case. Finding the arguments advanced by amici curiae briefs convincing, the
Sixth Circuit acknowledged the analogy between the recognized privacy
interests in telephone conversations and those in the content of emails. Warshak
I at 469-70. Like phone conversations and postal mail, the court reasoned that
the content of email is a form of private communication that the user seeks to
preserve as private, thus warranting constitutional protection:
Turning to the instant case, we have little difficulty agreeing with the
district court that individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in e-mails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a
commercial ISP. The content of e-mail is something that the user
"seeks to preserve as private," and therefore "may be constitutionally
protected." It goes without saying that like the telephone earlier in our
history, e-mail is an ever-increasing mode of private communication,
and protecting shared communications through this medium is as
important to Fourth Amendment principles today as protecting
telephone conversations has been in the past.
Warshak I at 473 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). The court
ruled that Warshak did have a valid privacy interest in the contents of his stored
emails, an interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Warshak, 631 F.3d
at 282 n.12; see also Bankston, supra note 14 ("There the 6th Circuit agreed
with [the] EFF that email users have a Fourth Amendment-protected expectation
of privacy in the email they store with their email providers. . . ."). A rehearing
en banc, however, vacated that decision due to lack of ripeness. Warshak II at
523.
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B. Warshak's Criminal Conviction Appeal to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals
On appeal, Warshak argued-among other things-that the ex
parte seizure of his emails without a warrant was a violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights." In response, the government claimed
that any Fourth Amendment violations that did occur were
"harmless."o Additionally, the government claimed that the search
and seizure of Warshak's emails was protected through its good
faith reliance on the SCA.6 1
In a decision applauded by many civil liberties groups,6 2 the
Sixth Circuit held that Warshak's Fourth Amendment rights had
been violated by the government's warrantless seizure of his
email.6' By compelling NuVox to turn over the contents of
Warshak's emails and taking possession thereof, the government
violated what the court found to be a reasonable expectation of
privacy in stored emails.
The court analogized stored emails to other forms of
communication already protected.' Referring to Katz v. United
States"5 and United States v. Jacobsen,66 the Sixth Circuit
considered the "expectation of privacy" analysis the Supreme
Court previously used to apply Fourth Amendment protections to
traditional forms of communication.6" In Katz, the Court found
that telephone users were "surely entitled to assume that the words
... utter[ed] into the mouthpiece w[ould] not be broadcast to the
world,"6 8 leading to a holding that has brought telephone
59 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 282.
60 id.
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., Bankston, supra note 14.
63 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 282.
64 Id. at 285.
65 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
66 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
67 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284.
68 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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conversations fully under the shelter of the Fourth Amendment. 69
Extending this doctrine, the Jacobsen court found that "[l]etters
and other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in
which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy," 70
based on the premise that a search arises any time the government
"infringes upon 'an expectation of privacy that society is prepared
to consider reasonable.'" 7
The existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy for emails
thus rests on two questions, requiring the court to analyze both the
Warshak fact pattern and the relationship between society and
email communication.72 In other words: (1) did Warshak, as the
subject of the search in question, manifest a subjective expectation
of privacy; and (2) was this expectation of privacy one that society
at large would recognize as reasonable?3
Looking first at Warshak's subjective expectation of privacy
regarding his email account, the court succinctly found that it was
"highly unlikely" that he expected his email would be made public
due to its content, described as "often sensitive and highly
damning." 74  Turning to the question of society's acceptance of
such an expectation of privacy as reasonable, the court first
recognized that "[m]uch hinges ... on whether the government is
permitted to request that a commercial ISP turn over the contents
of a subscriber's emails without triggering the . . . Fourth
Amendment[,]" given that access to an individual's email account
would give the government "the ability to peer deeply into his
activities." Quoting an article by Professors Susan Freiwald and
Patricia L. Bellia, the court concluded that "[g]iven the
fundamental similarities between email and traditional forms of
69 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746
(1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
7o United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984).
71 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284 (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 109).
72 Freiwald, supra note 11 (summarizing the subjective and objective
expectations of privacy analysis undertaken by the Sixth Circuit).
n See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284; Katz 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).




communication, it would defy common sense to afford emails
lesser Fourth Amendment protection." 6 Highly influential to this
conclusion was the indispensable role of email in American society
today, requiring that it be joined with other "essential" forms of
private communication under the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.
Despite finding that government agents had invaded Warshak's
reasonable expectation of privacy and violated his Fourth
Amendment rights, his appeal for an exclusionary remedy was
denied." Following previous decisions involving the SCA and
Fourth Amendment challenges, reversal was found
"unwarranted"" on the grounds that the "agents relied on the SCA
in good faith" believing it to be within the bounds of the
Constitution, and thus the exclusionary rule did not apply."
76 Id. at 285-86 (citing Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth
Amendment Protection for Stored E-mail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 135
(2008) (urging an elimination of unreasonable differences between the treatment
of email and other protected forms of communication)). The court did not
elaborate on what these "fundamental similarities" between email and traditional
forms of communication might be, though they did go on to say that "[e]mail is
the technological scion of tangible mail." Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285-86.
n Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286.
7 Id. at 288-89. Petitions for rehearing en banc of the Warshak case were
denied by the Sixth Circuit upon a finding that "the issues raised in the petitions
were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the cases."
U.S. v. Warshak, Nos. 08-3997/4085/4087/4212/4229/09-3176, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5007, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2011).
79 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 282. Good faith reliance is used as an exception to
the exclusionary rule where an agent acts in "objectively reasonable reliance
upon a statute that is later found unconstitutional," based on the idea that
penalizing the agent for a legislative error does not serve the exclusionary rule's
goal of deterring Fourth Amendment violations. Id. at 333-34 (Keith, J.,
concurring) (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350 (1987)).
80 Id. Warshak's convictions as well as those of his company were affirmed,
as were the forfeiture judgments against him. All of Harriet's convictions were
affirmed except for conspiracy to commit money laundering and money
laundering, which were reversed. The proceeds-money forfeiture judgment
against Harriet was affirmed, but her money-laundering forfeiture judgment
was reversed. The sentences of Warshak and Harriet were vacated and
remanded for resentencing. Id. at 333.
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IV. DOES WARSHAK UNDERSCORE THE NEED FOR
CONGRESSIONAL REVISION OF THE SCA?
A. Misuse of the SCA in the Warshak Investigation
One of the more contested issues in the Warshak search was
the government's use of the SCA to request that NuVox
prospectively preserve emails."' The SCA is considered by many
to regulate only retrospective surveillance of communications,82
leaving the Wiretap Act and the Pen Register statute to regulate
prospective communication." Section 2703(f) of the SCA, on
which the government agents relied to request preservation of
Warshak's emails, explicitly states that a service provider shall
take "all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in
its possession pending the issuance of a court order or other
process."84 By its plain language, section 2703(f) permits only the
preservation of emails in the possession of the service provider
when the request is made, not the prospective preservation of
future emails used in the Warshak investigation." Government
agents wishing to compel such prospective surveillance should
"comply with the [Wiretap Act and the Pen/Trap statute].""6
As NuVox was, by definition, a remote computing service,"
any emails stored with them could have been obtained via warrant,
an administrative subpoena, or a court order." However, the
emails retrieved by the government under the SCA, via their May
8' Id. at 283.
82 KERR, supra note 18, at 256 ("[T]he SCA deals with retrospective
surveillance instead of prospective surveillance.") (emphasis added). But see
Warshak, 631 F.3d at 290, note 21 (stating that "some courts and commentators
have suggested that § 2703(f) applies only retroactively .... However, the
language of the statute, on its face, does not compel this reading.").
83 See supra text accompanying note 19 on the Wiretap Act and the Pen
Register statute.
84 18 U.S.C. §2703(f) (2006) (emphasis added).
Warshak, 631 F.3d at 335 (Keith, J., concurring).8 6Id. at 335, citing U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 27, at 139.
87 Ben Kerschberg, Can the Government Seize Your Email Without A
Warrant? You'll Be Surprised, FORBES LAW & TECHNOLOGY BLOG (Feb. 8,
2011, 9:26 AM), http://blogs.forbes.com/benkerschberg/2011/02/08/can-the-
government-seize-your-email-without-a-warrant-youll-be-surprised-2/.
88 Id. See also supra text accompanying note 29.
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2005 ex parte court order, were actually copies of Warshak's
emails made by NuVox as a direct result of the October 2004
formal request for prospective preservation; in other words, these
emails would have been deleted from the NuVox server, and thus
would not have been in storage for the requisite 180 days, had the
preservation order to maintain all prospective emails not been
made by the agents."
This has led some to believe that the SCA was, at best,
misinterpreted or, at worst, abused. In an amicus brief, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") argued that:
[T]he government blatantly exceeded the scope of the SCA and
violated the Wiretap Act, . . . by secretly compelling NuVox to
prospectively "preserve" Warshak's emails, emails that the government
later obtained improperly and without a probable cause warrant using
the SCA's procedures. Put simply, the government misused the SCA
to conduct a "back door wiretap" of Warshak's emails and bypass the
Wiretap Act's strict requirements, including its requirement of probable
cause. 90
In a concurring opinion, agreeing with both the results and the
application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule,
Judge Keith expressed similar concerns to the methods used:
In practice, the government used the statute as a means to monitor
Warshak after the investigation started without his knowledge and
without a warrant. Such a practice is no more than back-door
wiretapping. I doubt that such actions, if contested directly in court,
would withstand the muster of the Fourth Amendment ... .To interpret
§ 2703(f) as having both a retroactive and prospective effect would be
contrary to the purpose of the statute as a whole .... [A] policy
whereby the government requests emails prospectively without a
warrant deeply concerns me. I am furthermore troubled by the
"Warshak, 631 F.3d at 335 (observing that "the provider would have
destroyed Warshak's old emails but for the government's request that they
maintain all current and prospective emails for almost a year"). See also supra
text accompanying note 49 (explaining that the emails would have been deleted
from the ISP server once Warshak downloaded them to his personal computer,
thus, had no copies been made pursuant to the prospective preservation order,
the emails would not have been available on the NuVox server).
90 Bankston, supra note 14. Presumably, as the Wiretap Act prohibits "real-
time interception of . . . computer communications," it would prevent
government agents from simply intercepting Warshak's emails as they were
received by NuVox. KERR, supra note 18, at 461.
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majority's willingness to disregard the current reading of § 2703(f)
without concern for future analysis of this statute.91
The belief that the government has been able to conduct secret,
warrantless seizures of email has led many to call for the SCA to
be reevaluated and updated to reflect the holding of the Sixth
Circuit in Warshak, requiring warrants for the seizure of stored
emails.92 Civil rights groups such as the Digital Due Process
Coalition" and the Electronic Frontier Foundation94 have used the
Warshak investigation as a rallying cry, supplying Congress with
suggested reforms and submitting amicus curie briefs to the Sixth
Circuit in support of Fourth Amendment protection.95
B. Twenty Four Years of Changing Technology: The Need for
Congressional Reform
Though the SCA currently has strong restrictions and
requirements for interception, the Warshak case brings to light a
glaring loophole. Government agents' use of the SCA to
command preservation of emails not yet created is not only
violative of the Act's overarching mission" but would likely fail
under Fourth Amendment scrutiny if directly contested. As noted
9' Warshak, 631 F.3d at 335 (Keith, J., concurring). Judge Keith further
explains that he agrees with the majority's holding that the evidence should not
be excluded, as it fell within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
Id. at 336.
92 Id. at 288.
9 See generally Who We Are, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION,
http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfn?objectid=DF652CEO-2552- 11 DF-
B455000C296BA163 (last visited Mar. 28, 2011) ("Digital Due Process is a
diverse coalition of privacy advocates, major companies and think tanks,
working together.").
94 See generally Our Work, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
https://www.eff.org/work (last visited Mar. 28, 2011) ("EFF is the leading civil
liberties group defending your rights in the digital world.").
95 See, e.g., Bankston, supra note 14; Freiwald, supra note 11 (calling for
Congressional reform of the "unconstitutional Stored Communications Act").
96 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 335 (Keith, J., concurring) (stating that the purpose of
the Stored Communications Act is to "maintain the boundaries between a
citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy and crime prevention in light of
quickly advancing technology").
9 Id "I doubt that such actions, if contested directly in court, would
withstand the muster of the Fourth Amendment." Id. Though the majority
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by Judge Keith in his concurring opinion, the practice was "no
more than back-door wiretapping," as the statute was used to
monitor the defendant's email without his knowledge and without
a warrant.9 8
If the purpose of the SCA is, as Judge Keith stated, "to
maintain the boundaries between a citizen's reasonable expectation
of privacy and crime prevention in light of quickly advancing
technology," then Warshak is a clear example of the need for
modification and fortification of the protective restrictions of the
statute.99 The SCA is limited, in its body, to requiring service
providers "to preserve records and other evidence in its possession
pending the issuance of a court order or other process.""oo Nothing
in the statute permits prospective email interception without a
proper warrant, a conclusion supported by the Warshak court.
Thus, an essential first step in mending the loopholes of the statute
would involve expressly forbidding the practice of prospective
preservation, through Congressional amendment to the SCA. The
constitutional boundaries need to be clearly laid out, putting an end
to the "good faith" reliance loophole around the exclusionary rule,
used by the Sixth Circuit in Warshak.10o
The prospective reforms need not end there. The Digital Due
Process Coalition has put together proposals for Congressional
review of the federal surveillance statutes, spurred by the need for
greater transparency, better notice requirements, and more serious
acknowledges the existence of a potential statutory violation, noting the
preclusion of the SCA to prospective preservation in the Department of Justice's
own computer-surveillance manual, they state that "this statutory violation,
whether it occurred or not, is irrelevant to the issue of good faith reliance." Id
at 290. As the actual violation at issue was for obtaining the emails, for which
the agents relied on §§ 2703(b) and 2703(d), any violations of § 2703(f) were
deemed immaterial. Id.
9 Id. at 335.
99 Id.
'oo 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (2006) (emphasis added).
101 Although the good faith exception was applied in Warshak, the majority
noted that the loophole is effectively closed after their decision, stating "[o]f
course, after today's decision, the good-faith calculus has changed, and a
reasonable officer may no longer assume that the Constitution permits
warrantless searches of private emails." Warshak, 631 F.3d at 289 n.17.
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consequences.'02 Though the warrant requirement now applies to
email in the Sixth Circuit, a congressional amendment could
quickly bring the rest of the nation up to speed, saving judicial
resources and expediting the process of patching a statute now
found to be, at least in part, unconstitutional. 0 3
It is no surprise that the SCA is in dire need of updating. In
1986, when the statute was passed, computer networking was "in
its infancy."'04 Enacted before the "advent of the World Wide Web
in 1990 and before the introduction of the web browser in 1994,"
the SCA "is best understood by considering its operation and
purpose in light of the technology that existed in 1986."'0 Though
the SCA remains, overall, good law, its application to modem
computing will involve "extracting operating principles from a
tangled legal framework." 06  Over twenty-four years of
technological advances suggest that a statute intended to address
cutting age technology in 1986 is just not going to cut it today.
V. WHERE To Go FROM HERE: THE APPLICATION OF
WARSHAK OUTSIDE THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
The Warshak decision is a monumental victory for
constitutional privacy advocates and a crucial first step towards
federal protection of stored email. However, it is essential to note
that, at this time, the decision is only binding within the four states
102 Freiwald, supra note 11 (calling for greater reforms such as "greater
transparency, notice to users, and meaningful remedies").
103 "[T]o the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain
such emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional." Warshak, 631 F.3d at
288.
104 Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (citing William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost? Cloud
Computing Privacy Under the Stored Communication Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195,
1198 (2010)).
"5 Id. at 971 n.15. See also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868,
874 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that "the difficulty is compounded by the fact that
the ECPA was written prior to the advent of the Internet and the World Wide
Web").
106 Robison, supra note 104, at 1204-05.
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comprising the Sixth Circuit.'o' With no cases on point in other
circuits and the likelihood of an impending appeal,' 8 it remains
unclear how the rest of the nation will treat the Warshak decision.
Will other circuits follow Warshak's rejection of the SCA as
"inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment"?'"
One of the most efficient ways to broaden Fourth Amendment
protection to the rest of the nation would be for the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari. Should the Supreme Court uphold the Sixth
Circuit and find a protection, it would ensure that the same
protections would be applied in all jurisdictions, guaranteeing vital
uniformity." Alternatively, the issue could be addressed by each
of the remaining eleven circuit courts. Though this could lead to
standardized results, individual circuit opinions risk the occurrence
of a circuit split, with different standards and tests arising in each
circuit. Additionally, the good faith exception would continue to
exist in each circuit until a similar case is heard and decided,
creating the potential for future "backdoor wiretapping.""' The
potential lack of uniformity would undoubtedly cause confusion in
an area of law that already has a high potential for
misunderstanding," 2 making a more uniform approach highly
favored. Thus, Congressional amendment of the SCA or Supreme
Court review appears to be, for now, the most favorable scenarios
for extending Warshak nationwide.
107 Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee make up the Sixth Circuit
states. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/intemet/index.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
'
08Freiwald, supra note 11 (acknowledging the uncertainty of both an appeal
and the result of a prospective appeal).
109 Gary Shockley, Snake Oil and Search Warrants, LAW 360 (Jan. 24, 2011),
http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/219536/snake-oil-and-search-
warrants.
11o Of course, there is also the possibility that the Supreme Court would
reverse Warshak, similar to the possibility of a reversal upon a rehearing en
banc.
11 Shockley, supra note 109.
112 See supra note 28 (discussing the complexity of the ECPA).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In his Olmstead v. United States"' dissent, Justice Brandeis
made one of the most frequently quoted comments"4 on privacy:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment ....
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom
are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.' 'i
Although email was not one of the sanctities the Supreme
Court might have considered in 1928, Justice Brandeis's comment
recognizes that future "privacies of life" would become important
as society advanced, necessitating continued expansion of Fourth
Amendment protection as new types of "sanctities" and new
methods of communication arose.
The Warshak decision underscores the importance of keeping
the Fourth Amendment in pace with our progressive technology.
In a world of cloud computing and Google, the concept of an
individual's "papers and effects" is rapidly evolving."' The
question of whether the law can keep up remains to be seen."' "If
courts are still struggling with electronic mail, how will they
" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, L.,
dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
114 Linder, supra note 1 (stating "[t]he most frequently quoted statement by a
Supreme Court justice on the subject of privacy comes in Justice Brandeis's
dissent in Olmstead v. U.S.").
"' Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
116 Bagley, supra note 9, at 153.
" Shockley, supra note 109.
SPRING 2011] 367
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
address the challenges presented by mobile devices, ubiquitous
internet access and cloud computing?"" 8
The most effective approach will likely be for the courts to
tackle these issues one by one as they prove to be problematic,
resolving each question in a way that provides both useful
guidance and necessary flexibility for resolving future
technological legal dilemmas. For now, privacy advocates will
have to await the final word on the expectation of privacy with
stored emails, in order to determine if the Fourth Amendment will
one day apply to everyone's inbox.
118 Id.
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